'Social learning' is a process whereby economic agents learn by observing the behaviour of others. 'Social learning in networks' requires sophistication because individuals draw inferences from the behaviour of agents they cannot directly observe. Theoretical research suggests that, even if networks are very incomplete, social learning leads to uniform behaviour. Experimental evidence suggests that learning in networks conforms quite well to theoretical predictions. It also illustrates how the network architecture influences the pattern of learning and the efficiency of information aggregation.
'Social learning' is a process whereby economic agents learn by observing the actions (but not the payoffs) of others; 'social learning in networks' applies this idea to situations in which individuals observe the other individuals to whom they are connected in a social network. Griliches (1957) first studied the gradual adoption of corn planted with hybrid seed in the US, a new agricultural technique, from the early 1930s to mid-1950s. He observed that at first farmers learned from salespersons; later they learned from their neighbours. The result was an S-shaped time profile of adoption. A number of recent papers, including Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) , Conley and Udry (2001) , Kremer and Miguel (2003) and Munshi (2004) examine how agents in developing countries learn from their social contacts when deciding whether to adopt new technologies.
The classical model of social learning, first studied by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) , and extended by Smith and Sørensen (2000) , assumes a pure information externality. An agent's payoff u(a,w) depends only on his own action a and an unknown state of nature w. Each agent i has private information about the state and his choice of action a will reflect that information. By observing an agent's action, it is possible to learn something about his information and make a better decision. The problem is that agents may rationally ignore their own information and 'follow the herd', that is, imitate the actions they see others choose. So-called herd behaviour and informational cascades can arise very rapidly, before much information has been revealed, and often result in inefficient choices. A number of experimental studies replicate herd behaviour in the laboratory.
The classical models assume that agents make decisions sequentially and observe the action chosen by each of their predecessors. In reality, individuals are bound together by a social network, the complex of relationships that brings them into contact with other agents, such as neighbours, co-workers, family, and so on. A specific framework, introduced by Gale and Kariv (2003) , henceforth GK, assumes that individuals are bound together by a social network and can observe the agents to whom they are connected only through the network. The social network is represented by a directed graph in which nodes correspond to agents and agent i can observe agent j if there is an edge leading from node i to node j. In order to model the diffusion of information through the network, GK assume that agents choose actions simultaneously and revise their decisions as new information is received. More precisely, an agent whose current information is I chooses an action a to maximize his short-run payoff E½uða; wÞjI. GK rationalize non-strategic behaviour by assuming there is a large number of agents of each type, so a single agent's decision has no impact on the future play of the game.
An agent's beliefs can be represented by a random sequence of probability distributions P t (o). At date t, an agent derives a posterior P t+1 (w) from the prior P t (w) and the new information received. These beliefs satisfy the martingale property E½P tþ1 jI t ¼ P t , and the martingale convergence theorem implies that these beliefs converge to a constant with probability one. The limiting beliefs are not necessarily uniform (different agents may have different beliefs) and need not be fully revealing. However, in connected networks, where every agent is connected directly or indirectly with every other agent, the initial diversity of actions is eventually replaced by uniformity. More precisely, except in cases of indifference, agents will choose the same action. This is the network-learning analogue of the herd behaviour found in the classical social learning model. The proof of uniformity makes use of the imitation principle. If agent i can observe the actions of agent j, agent i must be able to do as well as j on average (because one feasible strategy is to choose the same action j). In a connected network, all agents get the same payoff on average and this implies that they choose different actions only if they are indifferent.
Learning in a network is 'simply' a matter of Bayesian updating, but a rational agent must take account of the network architecture in order to update correctly. For example, suppose there are three (types of) agents, A, B, and C, arranged in a circle: A observes B, B observes C, and C observes A. At the first decision, A has not yet had a chance to observe B, so he makes his decision based on his private information. Before the second decision, A observes B's first decision and uses it to update his beliefs about the true state of nature. Before the third decision, A observes B's second decision and realizes that any change from the first must be based on B's observation of C's first decision. So now A can make some inference about C's private information and update his beliefs accordingly. This learning can go on for some time. Eventually, A may observe changes in B's action that were prompted by changes in C's action that were prompted by C's observation of A. Even this is informative because it reveals how strong C's information is relative to A's. In any case, exploiting fully the information revealed in a network requires agents to consider not only what they observe, but also what their neighbours observe, what their neighbours' neighbors observe, and so on. The chains of inferences that rational individuals make naturally involve hierarchies of beliefs, that is, beliefs about a neighbour's beliefs about a neighbour's beliefs about y.
The complexity of Bayesian learning in networks has led some authors to suggest that models of bounded rationality are more appropriate for describing learning in networks. Bala and Goyal (1998) examine the decisions of boundedly rational agents, who try to extract information from the actions and payoffs of the agents they observe, but without taking account of the fact that those agents also observe other agents. Hence, there is private information in the Bala-Goyal model, but agents are assumed to ignore it. In the Bala-Goyal model, at each date, an agent chooses one of several available actions with unknown payoff distributions. Agents can observe the actions and payoffs of their neighbours (those to whom they are directly connected by the network) and use this information to update their beliefs about the payoff distribution. Thus, agents learn by observing the outcome (payoff) of an experiment (choice of action) rather than by inferring another agent's private information from his action. This is a model of social experimentation, in the sense that it generalizes the problem of a single agent experimenting with a multi-armed bandit to a social setting, rather than social learning. A model of social experimentation is quite different from a model of social learning because there is an informational externality but there is no informational asymmetry. As with Bayesian learning, boundedly rational learning implies convergence of beliefs and uniformity of actions in the limit.
learning and information aggregation in networks
Laboratory experiments provide the cleanest test for the theory since subjects' neighbourhoods and private information can be controlled. Choi, Gale and Kariv (2004; 2005) describe the results of an experimental investigation of learning in networks based on the model of GK. The experiments involve three-person, connected social networks. The experimental design uses three representative networks: the complete network, in which each agent can observe the actions chosen by the other agents; the star network, in which one agent, the centre, can observe the actions of the other two peripheral agents, and the peripheral agents can observe only the centre; and the circle network, in which each agent can observe only one other agent and each agent is observed by one other agent. Despite the small number of players in each game, it can be shown that myopic payoff maximization is rational: there is no gain to strategic behaviour. Nonetheless, larger-scale experiments might be informative.
The experimental data from these studies exhibit a strong tendency toward herd behaviour, but despite this tendency the efficiency of information aggregation is quite good. Although convergence to a uniform action is quite rapid, frequently occurring within two to three turns, there are significant differences between the behaviour of different networks. Most herds entail correct decisions, which is consistent with the predictions of the parametric model underlying the experimental design. Comparing the behaviour of different individuals indicates that there is indeed high variation in individual behaviour across subjects, but the error rates (the proportion of times a subject deviates from the best response) are uniformly fairly low.
These results suggest that the theory adequately accounts for large-scale features of the data, but in some situations the theory does less well in accounting for subjects' behaviour. It is likely that the theory fails in those situations because the complexity of the decision problem exceeds the bounded rationality of the subjects. Clearly, because of the lack of common knowledge in the networks, the decision problems faced by subjects require quite sophisticated reasoning. Subjects' success or failure in the experiment results from the appropriateness of the heuristics they use as much as the inherent difficulty of the decision-making. Thus, an important subject for future research is to identify 'black spots' where the theory does least well in interpreting the data and ask whether additional 'behavioural' explanations might be needed to account for the subjects' behaviour.
Many important questions about social learning in networks remain to be explored. While small networks can be very insightful, especially in experimental contexts, the development of the theory depends on properties of networks that can be generalized. The recent discovery of Baraba´si and Albert (1999) that many networks are scale-free, in the sense that a few nodes are hubs, which have a very large number of links to other nodes whereas most nodes have just a few, has significant implications for the efficiency of information aggregation. Once information reaches a hub it passes to numerous other nodes and spreads rapidly throughout the entire population, but if the hub's information is of poor quality its disproportionate influence becomes a disadvantage. Thus, the impact of hubs on the efficiency of information aggregation is not clear. Perhaps the most important subject for future research is to identify the impact of network architecture on the efficiency and dynamics of social learning. Progress in this area requires both new theory and new experimental data. 
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